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Summary: Since the economic and financial crisis of 2008, proposals on economic policy devised on the basis of hysteresis 
have become the focus of economic sciences. This study presents some theories on the 2008 crisis and subsequent hysteresis, 
as well as related economic policy proposals. The crisis and hysteresis acted as theoretical catalysts and, by expanding 
the boundaries of previous main theories, sometimes produced significant results, and continue to do so to this very day. 
Hysteresis is also significant from the point of view of the Hungarian economy, as the crisis has hit the country particularly 
hard. However, as a result of the post-2010 economic policy shift, the government has been able to rebalance and put the 
economy back on a growth path. This can also be called a positive hysteresis, as the economy is growing steadily and faster 
than expected based on this trend.1
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The economic and financial crisis of 2008 
and the slow recovery that followed have 
surprised not only economic actors but also 
a significant number of theoreticians and 
economic scientists.
The crisis and hysteresis acted as theoretical 
catalysts and, by expanding the boundaries 
of previous theories, sometimes produced 
significant results, and continue to do so 
to this very day. The presentation of some 
of these results is the subject of our study 
below. We are presenting theories that have 
attempted to move further towards theoretical 
renewal, leaving behind them, or even 
amend some of the unquestioned dogmas 
of dominant neoclassical theory. Our focus 
is on presenting the, if you like, unorthodox 
nature of the theories discussed. The well-
executed implementation of the latter, even 
if had discussed just a few theories, goes far 
beyond the scope of a journal article, both in 
extent and depth. Similarly, detailed testing on 
empirical data would exceed the scope of the 
journal.
in the present study, we will first introduce 
the concept of hysteresis and its extent. We 
then discuss theories in selected areas, such 
as technology developments, financial crises, 
the relationship between cycle and trend, and 
fiscal multipliers.
E-mail address: posgay@szazadveg.hu; 
regos@szazadveg.hu; horvath.dia@szazadveg.hu; 
molnar.daniel@szazadveg.hu
 StudieS 
Public Finance Quarterly  2019/3 415
THE ConCEPT and SigniFiCanCE 
oF HySTErESiS
The concept of hysteresis (Blanchard and 
Summers, 1986) first emerged in the last 
century2 and became more widespread in the 
context of the 2008 crisis. More generally, it 
refers to a post-crisis slowdown relative to the 
expected trend-based growth.
The significant change in the perception 
of hysteresis can be illustrated by comparing 
statements made by one who gave a name to the 
phenomenon, Blanchard, before the outbreak 
of the crisis (‘macroeconomic conditions are 
good…’ 3) with the enormous efforts made by 
him and others after the crisis to understand 
the phenomenon (see e.g.: Blanchard and 
Summers, 2015).
Hysteresis triggered some sort of fermentation 
in economic thinking in the context of which 
some former dominant theoretical tendencies 
were put under considerable fire. There are 
those who interpret the occurrence of the crisis, 
the economic policy responses given to it, and 
the resulting challenges of economic growth, as 
a result of the failure of economic theoretical 
thinking.
Stiglitz (2012, 2014) clearly attributes the 
crisis to human factors, which he said were far 
from being inevitable. in his opinion, the policies 
of the uS monetary and financial regulators 
have led to a crisis in the uS and europe, but 
the responsibility of economists and their 
models is also significant. Not only were the 
standard models unable to predict the crisis, but 
based on these models, such a crisis could not 
have happened, so they were not able to provide 
a way out for the economic policy. Following 
the bursting of the bubble, it has been shown 
that the crisis will be contained, requiring no 
significant change in economic policy patterns 
or macroeconomic paradigms (Blanchard et al., 
2010). According to Stiglitz, one of the major 
shortcomings of the models was their inability 
to propose an adequate prototype for the credit 
market, although this was not the first time in 
economic history that the credit boom had led 
to a major downturn (see as first example to this 
speculative bubble the ‘tulip Mania’ of 1637).
Stiglitz, referring to his earlier work 
(Stiglitz, 1982 in Stiglitz, 2014: 5), noted that 
asymmetric knowledge, even under the rational 
expectation hypothesis, clearly demonstrates 
the need to incorporate behavioural economics 
into economic models. This was strongly 
confirmed by the behavioural characteristics of 
market participants in the run-up to the 2008 
crisis, as much of it was inconsistent with 
the description of the paradigm of rational 
behaviour under optimal awareness.
Stiglitz (2014) also criticises Keynesian-based 
models using Hicks’ fixed wage / price theory. 
Recognising the possibility of involuntary 
unemployment as a ‘market failure’ does not 
mean that these models are ‘good’. The model 
assumes that with a wage flexible downward, 
if the wage earners accepted lower wages, and 
were not prevented to do so by unions and 
sometimes by the state, then the labour market 
could be cleared up, and the economy would 
return to a potential growth. The crisis has 
also shown the flaws of these models, as in its 
early years the uS – which has perhaps the 
most flexible labour market among developed 
countries – performed much worse than the 
northern european countries. According to 
Stiglitz, in fact, these models were discredited 
much earlier, as there were high unemployment 
rates in many countries where there was little or 
no union or state regulation to protect labour.
Stiglitz believes that transforming eco-
nomics requires alternative models that can 
provide better answers to the three main 
questions behind deep recessions:
What may cause the disorder? – 
According to standard models, the external 
technology shocks; although the reality is that 
market participants trigger these incidents.
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Why do small shocks seem to have a 
great effect? – Contrary to classic theory, the 
system does not blunt shocks rather often 
amplifies them.
Why does the downward phase last so 
long when we have at hand the same human, 
physical and natural resources before and after 
the crisis? – Standard theories do not explain 
the delay.
Hysteresis has become a central topic 
of economic analysis, not only for its 
theoretical importance but also for its practical 
repercussions. Ball (2014) attempted to measure 
long-term losses derived from hysteresis. The 
conclusion was that countries with the deepest 
recession can expect the greatest losses in the 
long run. Based on the aggregate figures of 23 
countries, the potential output loss was 8.4 
percent in 2015 according to Ball, the size of the 
German economy, as though the crisis would 
have entirely wiped the latter out.
Ball suggests that it would be important 
to clarify whether the effects of the crisis are 
asymmetric, in order to make it possible to 
respond in the long run to the damage it causes.
CyClE and TrEnd rElaTionSHiP, 
SECular STagnaTion
According to the traditional approach, the 
supply-driven long-term growth equilibrium 
path – the trend – is unaffected by short-term 
cyclic fluctuations in demand; consequently, 
the output should return to its original path 
defined by the trend, within a few years.
On the Actuality of  the Theory 
of  Secular Stagnation
Concerning the relationship between trend 
and cycle, the concept of slowing down the 
trend naturally (e.g. due to demographic 
or technological reasons) has emerged in 
interpreting the slow recovery after the crisis. 
Summers (2013, 2014, 2016) pointed out the 
potential danger of the secular stagnation4 
becoming current. He raised the question of 
whether it is possible that the uS and major 
economies will not be able to return to full 
employment and stable growth without 
unorthodox economic policies. Short-
term interest rates have been significantly 
distorted by the zero lower bound, and real 
interest rates may not have fallen sufficiently 
to encourage investments to the level needed 
for full employment. in addition, falling 
prices and wages had an exacerbating effect 
by encouraging consumers and investors to 
postpone their spending.
According to Summers (2014), long-term 
growth trends may be adversely influenced by 
changes in business cycles, especially when the 
efficiency of monetary policy is questioned 
at zero lower bound. The uS economy in 
2014 performed 10 percent lower than it was 
projected for that year in 2007. 5 percentage 
points resulted from the 2013 revision of the 
trend estimate and another 5 percentage points 
from the estimated output gap. in terms of 
employment rates, the post-crisis decline was 
only slightly offset in the 25-54 age group.
Craighead (2019) demonstrated with 
the help of a new Keynesian model that 
the impact of a shock on the economy also 
raises the natural level of the unemployment 
rate as a result of the efficiency of the labour 
market and, consequently, the increase in the 
number of long-term unemployed, ergo it has 
a structural effect.
The situation in Hungary was similar. 
extrapolating the GdP growth trend between 
1995 and 2006 to 2018 shows that real GdP 
in 2018 was 32.6 percent below the pre-crisis 
trend (see Figure 1). Summers (2014) estimates 
that the backlog in the uS is mainly due to 
slower capital growth and lower working 
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hours. By contrast, in Hungary, according to 
our calculations, the employment rate stood 
at a higher level than previously as a result 
of post-2010 reform measures. However, the 
backlog was to a greater extent due to lower 
productivity of recruited new labour and, 
to a lesser extent, to lower level of available 
funds. Váry (2019) also confirmed that the 
2008 crisis had a long-term impact on most 
advanced economies.
The crisis has hit Hungary much harder than 
its regional competitors due to its past over-
indebtedness. Strategic changes were needed 
for the economy to recover, as presented in the 
study by György and Veress (2016). The most 
important elements of this are the following:
•	increasing employment – reducing the 
number of people living on aid and 
activating them in the labour market;
•	Reducing the tax burden on SMes;
•	introducing sector-specific taxes, which 
made possible to reduce taxes on labour;
•	increasing net wages;
•	Reducing external debt;
•	Reducing the foreign currency ratio 
within the public debt;
•	increasing the state’s share in operating 
assets.
According to the study, post-2010 
economic policies aimed at addressing 
previous strategic missteps. They succeeded 
in putting the economy back on the path of 
Figure 1
VALUE OF HUNGARIAN GDP AT 2005 PRICES AND TREND ESTIMATE ESTABLISHED  
BY 2006 AND 2018
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical office (HCSo), and own calculations
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growth following previous imbalances. The 
new economic strategy also affected the system 
of public finance (domokos, 2011). Domokos 
argues in favour of the need for institutional 
restructuring with disciplined budget policies 
as well as sound and responsible public 
finances, demonstrating past failures. in this 
context, he analyses the debt rules in the 
Fundamental Law, the transformation of the 
National Fiscal Council and the State Audit 
Office of Hungary. Lentner (2015) emphasises 
the importance of sharing the social burden 
and on the involvement of the government (in 
monetary policy and control of public finance) 
within the context of the economic policy shift 
since 2010.
From a hysteresis point of view, these 
changes mean that GdP has fallen short 
of expectations on account of the effects of 
the crisis; however, as a result of the strategy 
change, the Hungarian economy has been able 
to set itself on a higher growth path; thus, 
potential growth may also be higher than in 
the past. This can also be called a positive 
hysteresis, which means that as a result of 
successful reforms potential growth reaches 
a higher level, positioning the economy not 
under, as previously expected, but on top of 
the potential growth path. The question is, of 
course, what would happen during another 
crisis. in this very case, positive hysteresis 
is valid too, inasmuch as the impact of the 
crisis, and hence the extent of the long-term 
decline may be smaller than before as a result 
of economic policy reforms.
in contrast, many eu countries have not 
managed to overcome the crisis for the lack 
of unconventional measures: Greece’s GdP 
at 2005 prices was 23.6 percent lower in 
2018 compared to 2008; italy’s was lagging 
behind with 3.3 percent. All of this could 
have happened despite the introduction 
of eCB’s unconventional monetary policy 
instruments in both countries; however, these 
measures have not proved to be sufficient in 
themselves. According to Summers (2014), 
the pre-crisis growth rate was unsustainable, 
which is explained by the exaggerated increase 
in real estate prices, up to 100 percent on an 
annual basis in certain periods. However, no 
such tendency can be seen in Hungary, and 
before the crisis, real estate prices have rather 
tended to decline. This was also accompanied 
by a significant increase in the debt-to-income 
ratio in the uS, which was also observed in 
Hungary (Figure 2).
The relative price of capital goods has been 
steadily declining except for the years of the 
2008 crisis (Summers, 2014). in addition, as we 
may observe, central banks have accumulated 
substantial reserves, disproportionately in 
highly secure assets. The combined effect of the 
above is a significant reduction in the natural 
interest rate. The decline in real interest rates 
can also be observed in Hungary: inflation of 
around 3 percent is accompanied by central 
bank base-rates and interbank interest rates 
below 1 percent.
on THE CriTiCiSm oF THE THEory 
oF SECular STagnaTion
Rogoff (2015) criticised the theory of secular 
stagnation and explained the delay in recovery 
with the characteristics of the financial cycle. 
This is evidenced by the u-curve of per capita 
income, along with the rate of decline in 
output, which typically characterises recovery 
from deep financial crises. The financial cycle 
also explains the size of the real estate (mainly 
housing) bubble and its burst, the level of 
leverage that accompanies the bubble, the 
evolution of asset prices before and after the 
crisis, and the fact that after the crisis the rise 
in unemployment has been far more sustained 
than after an ordinary recession that is not 
accompanied by a financial crisis. As a result of 
 StudieS 
Public Finance Quarterly  2019/3 419
rising loans, asset prices rise, increasing their 
value as collateral, thereby facilitating loan 
expansion and further asset price increases. 
When the bubble bursts, the whole process 
breaks into the radical opposite of the previous 
one. According to the author, too much 
emphasis has been put on orthodox economic 
policy responses tailored to the crisis and too 
little on unorthodox ones, though they are 
better suited to dealing with a crisis exacerbated 
by a financial market crisis. decision-makers 
should have enforced debt write-offs more 
strongly in the process of bank consolidation 
and recapitalisation. in addition, according 
to Rogoff, a more aggressive rate hike policy 
prior to the outbreak could have avoided the 
problem of zero interest rates. Fiscal policy 
(one of the tools of the orthodox response) 
was initially useful, but then many countries 
prematurely restrained spending.
According to the author, secular factors 
(demographic decline in developed countries, 
expected decline in female labour inflow into 
the economy, or slowing growth in Asian 
countries) have always played a role in the 
outbreak of the crisis, while bank crises have 
always been linked to facts having much deeper 
roots, while they were rather mechanisms 
for reinforcing the crisis, not the triggers of 
them. Stiglitz (2014) expressed doubts about 
the role of real interest rates. in his opinion 
(especially outside the real estate sector), there 
is insufficient evidence of the impact of the real 
interest rate on investment, rather the nominal 
interest rate is significant. The traditional 
mechanism, which provides that lower interest 
rates can have a positive long-term effect on the 
economy, is triggered by increased inflows of 
more favourable loans. However, this does not 
play a role today for the following reasons:
Figure 2
DEBT/INCOME RATIO OF HOUSEHOLDS IN HUNGARY  
BETWEEN 1995 AND 2017
Source: HCSo, Central Bank of Hungary (mnB), and own calculations 
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The situation of the most credit-
constrained companies, mainly SMes, has 
remained unchanged and their supply of 
financial resources remains limited. While large 
banks were given significant funds, restored 
their balance sheets through monopoly profits 
and speculative profits, smaller regional and 
community banks, on which SMes depend, 
remained weak.
Large multinationals have accumulated 
significant cash holdings. if the interest market 
did not encourage them to invest, a smaller 
change in interest rates should not be enough 
either.
Bank consolidation for preserving the 
banking system has created non-competitive 
markets where market leaders did not share 
lower interest rates with consumers, rather 
enjoyed even greater margins.
in a globalised world, money flows where 
returns are higher: so it goes where it is not 
needed, not where it should be.
The activities of central banks are often 
contradictory: one provides liquidity while the 
other restraints it.
According to the logic of standard models, 
companies have access to capital at low interest 
rates in the long term and will consequently 
finance capital intensive investments as 
the cost of capital goods is lower than that 
of wages. This means that at any level of 
output, employment will decline, meaning 
loose monetary policy may lead to a rise 
in unemployment. However, Stiglitz does 
not argue for the need for tighter monetary 
policy, but maintains that for incentivising 
the economy, rather than monetary policy, a 
different economic policy is required.
Eggertsson et al. (2019) modelled secular 
stagnation using an overlapping generations 
(OLG) model. They argue that low interest 
rates – contrary to the assumptions formulated 
in the literature – are not only temporary, but 
they also do not automatically disappear, they 
should be eliminated. two solutions are being 
explored to eliminate negative real interest 
rates: raising the inflation target, and applying 
a fiscal stimulus. Raising the inflation target is 
less recommended, given the need for a large 
increase in target, on the one hand; moreover, 
it wouldn’t eliminate the secular stagnation 
behaving as an equilibrium, on the other 
hand. in contrast, fiscal expansion may be 
appropriate to solve problems.
Summers’ (2013, 2014) secular stagnation 
theory goes beyond the traditional 
interpretation of the trend-cycle relationship, 
demonstrates and quantifies the trend-
destroying effect of the cycle, emphasises 
the importance of the lack of demand, and 
considers increasing demand by the means of 
increasing public investment. Rogoff (2015) 
and Stiglitz (2014) criticised Summers for using 
the model to represent the natural real interest 
rate as a general equilibrium factor, remaining 
within the limits of the traditional theoretical 
concept. Stiglitz also highlights a number of 
factors in the economy, which in the current 
economic climate, may call into question 
the efficiency of the orthodox monetary 
measures, thus challenging the dominant pre-
crisis theoretical trend. Rogoff’s concept that 
explains pretended secular stagnation by a 
financial crisis, points to the limited efficiency 
of using the anti-crisis orthodox toolkit in 
managing the financial crisis, and underlines 
at the same time that embedding lending 
super-cycles in a macroeconomic model is a 
major constraint on the pre-crisis dominant 
theoretical trend.
After having a closer look at the Hungarian 
figures, we have to agree with Summers 
that we have to go beyond the traditional 
interpretation of the trend-cycle relationship. 
Contrary to the theory of secular stagnation, it 
is important to emphasise the role of financial 
cycles, which also contributed significantly to 
the prolongation of the crisis in Hungary, due 
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to the over-indebtedness before 2008, as well 
as to the freezing of borrowing. At the same 
time, securing access to credit and thereby 
reducing interest rates played an important 
role in the recovery from the crisis. However, 
these investments, although being in many 
cases capital intensive financing, did not 
entail a reduction in labour demand rather 
an expansion due to their nature to expand 
capacity. However, we also agree with Stiglitz’s 
finding that nominal interest rate evolutions 
are more important than real interest rate 
ones, as the former is easier to cope with for 
borrowers.
THEoriES on THE rElaTionSHiP 
BETwEEn HySTErESiS 
and TECHnologiCal dEvEloPmEnTS 
and invESTmEnTS
The long-term growth of a country is 
significantly determined by its investments 
in R&d, infrastructure projects, and human 
capital (Verspagen, 2005). A critical element 
of the relationship between trend and cycle 
is the correlation that links technological 
development, innovation and investment 
activity. technological progress is reflected in 
the economy through innovation activities via 
investments, while investments show a cyclical 
dependence; consequently, it is hysteresis 
that influences technological progress in 
the development of both investment and 
innovation activities.
Regarding the role of supply and demand, 
and innovation in hysteresis, Reifschneider et 
al. (2015) analysed the supply-side damage 
suffered by the uS economy as a result of the 
crisis. They found out that, according to the 
2000-2007 trend, the loss was about 7 percent 
of potential output by the end of 2014. They 
estimate that labour productivity has suffered 
the most significant decline compared to the 
trend, as a result of a sharp decline in the 
accumulation of capital and a slower increase 
in the ratio of aggregate output (total-factor 
productivity, tFP). The decline on the supply-
side is seen as an endogenous response to 
weak aggregate demand. The slower rise of the 
tFP is due to a disproportionate reduction in 
the number of new entrants using the latest 
technology during the downward phase of the 
cycle.
Garcia-Macia (2015) highlighted the role 
of intangible capital and innovation. He found 
that financial shocks significantly increase 
the cost of financing intangible capital, and 
the resulting decline in the accumulation of 
intangible capital causes that output remains 
below trend. An analysis of data from the 
Spanish manufacturing industry revealed 
that more than half of the decrease in value 
added between 2008 and 2013, was due to the 
specific characteristics of intangible assets.
Because intangible capital is harder to 
accept as collateral for loans than is tangible 
capital, lenders expect a lower rate of return 
in the event of insolvency, which increases 
the cost of intangible capital during financial 
shocks.
The recession in the Spanish manufacturing 
industry has been accompanied by high 
indebtedness, a fall in investment, as well as 
a large-scale dissolution of companies that use 
intangible capital intensively. The author also 
states that the spread of innovation is always 
slower with less depreciation of capital. This 
infiltration factor alone nearly doubled the 
expected catch-up time for GdP. The author 
stated that the faster recovery in the uS was 
partly due to the fact that in the uS the role 
of private equity is more significant, while 
innovation in europe is essentially credit-
driven.
Garcia-Macia has criticised a program 
developed by the european union known as 
the Juncker Plan, in which the size of credit 
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support for riskier investments is determined 
by company size. instead, he suggests that 
companies shall be offered an age-based capital 
transfer allowance that would mitigate the 
effects of financial shocks, make it easier for 
younger companies to obtain credit, so they 
will be provided with higher rates of return as a 
result of tangible and, in particular, intangible 
investments. At the macroeconomic level, 
this would result in healthier asset allocation 
and higher growth path. According to this 
model, if his proposal had been implemented 
from 2009, it would have reduced the GdP 
gap from 13.2 percent to 2.7 percent for the 
period between 2008 and 2013.
Bianchi et al. (2014) in their dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium (dSGe) 
model treated technological development as 
well as adaptation and penetration rates as 
endogenous factors, and then examined the 
impact of the 2001 recession and the 2008 
crisis on technological development. the 
analysis showed a close relationship between 
business cyclical fluctuations and long-
term growth dynamics. The positive shock 
of marginal investment efficiency leads to 
an increase in physical capital investment, 
which increases the marginal productivity 
of R&d capital (i.e. knowledge capital) due 
to increased production. Higher emergence 
of R&d capital and higher technology 
adoption and implementation rates lead to 
sustained growth as a result of circulation of 
knowledge, which plays a significant role in 
the consequences of recessions, especially over 
a longer time period.
The authors concluded that the 2008 crisis 
was accompanied by a significant decline in 
technology adaptation and its implementation 
rates, while R&d remained basically 
unaffected. in the recession of 2001, R&d 
investments declined substantially following 
the burst of the information technology 
bubble; nevertheless, only a slight change in 
technology adaptation rates occurred. The 
recent recession was much more severe in the 
short term, in spite of that was less pronounced 
as to the growth of the trend in the longer 
term than in 2001.
According to eurostat, the value of R&d 
expenditures to GdP ratio in the Visegrád 
countries (i.e. CZ, Hu, PL SK), as well as 
in the eu, was not influenced by the 2008 
crisis, nonetheless investment volumes fell (see 
Figure 3).
Sedgley et al. (2018) examined the impact 
of business cycles on business R&d spending 
in 22 developed countries. According to their 
results, companies’ R&d investments are pro-
cyclical even when credit constraints are taken 
into account, and the responses to the cycle 
are symmetrical. evidence has also been found 
that there is a link between borrowing trends 
and R&d spending, but this is less due to 
credit constraints than to a decline in credit 
demand.
As a result of the crisis, debates have 
also emerged (Bianchi et al., 2014) on how 
innovation and technological development 
should serve sustainable growth, with 
particular emphasis on state involvement.
According to Mazzucato and Perez (2014), 
the post-crisis situation could not be treated 
through standard budget and monetary policy 
instruments, even when complemented with 
the reform of the financial system. Major 
institutional innovations are needed to 
overcome an economy dominated by monetary 
policy, and the social discrepancies resulting 
from deeply polarised income relations. 
This requires the provision of profitable 
opportunities for an enormous innovation 
potential and the creation of the conditions 
of fair income distribution. According to the 
authors, for the development of innovation-led 
growth financial and macroeconomic growth 
policy reform is needed, where ‘smart’ and 
inclusive growth is state-led and innovation-
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led. This can only go hand in hand with the 
reform of the current model of state control, 
which will result in an enhanced incentive for 
companies to reinvest their profits in sectors 
that create long-term value, such as human 
capital training or R&d. it is necessary for the 
state to set a clear direction for innovation, to 
elaborate a coherent policy, and to shape the 
playing field as well as the rules of the game to 
reward companies that are willing to and able 
to invest in future opportunities.
in our opinion, the cyclical fluctuation of 
R&d&i spending is a natural process: in the 
event of a crisis, businesses can easily downsize 
these activities in the short term; however, 
it may result in a competitive disadvantage 
in the long run. in Hungary, the tendency 
of companies to innovate is low anyway, so 
in the case of a future crisis efforts must be 
made not to reduce it to an even lower level, 
connecting to Bianchi et al. (2014) study, we 
can emphasise that the  state can also play an 
important role, as it can help sustain R&d 
activities.
HySTErESiS, rElaTionSHiP BETwEEn 
FinanCial CriSiS and CyClES
One of the main triggers of the 2008 crisis was 
the real estate bubble in the 2000s, followed 
by a financial crisis, which was hounded by 
forced balance sheet adjustments (Kiss and 
Szilágyi, 2014; MNB, 2016). The crisis has 
shown that debt can negatively affect long-
term growth opportunities. Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2010) concluded that once a country’s 
debt reaches 90 percent of the GdP, additional 
debt significantly damages growth. However, 
many criticised their findings. Stiglitz (2014) 
emphasises that forms of expenditure and the 
effects of general economic conditions must 
be taken into account if such rates are to be 
determined. Herndon et al. (2014) suggest that 
Reinhart and Rogoff made methodological 
errors in data cleansing and weighting, 
which led to a broader scale of growth for the 
countries concerned.
According to Minsky’s (1992) hypothesis, 
financial markets are prone to instability 
Figure 3
R&D AND INVESTMENT EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP
Source: Eurostat
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and bubbles may take shape within market 
economies. if for some reason, the investment 
market starts sparkling, high returns from the 
effervescent type of instruments are expected, 
and investors keep reinvesting. And banks will 
issue more credit while loosening conditions. 
Those who leave when price is at its climax 
can make big profits, and when the bubble 
begins to shrink, panic breaks out and almost 
everyone wants to get rid of their investment 
at once. in this process the so-called Minsky-
moment occurs when banks and other lenders 
are forced to sell even their safe assets in 
order to pay off their due obligations. in the 
inevitability of financial market bubbles and 
financial instability, Minsky believes that 
when times are better, banks increase their risk 
tolerance level hoping for high returns, and 
borrow more and more to finance these assets 
and increase their profits.
Regarding the specific effects of lending 
activity, Guzman and Stiglitz’s (2015) 
Pseudo-Wealth theory draws attention to 
the disadvantage of relatively small-scale 
effects being not reflected in models (such as 
different expectations of different economic 
agents) that may, however, result in large-
scale drifts in the real economy. The practical 
implication of this finding is that if economic 
policy does not take this into account, it will 
underestimate the time of recovery (as it was 
the case with the iMF and Fed models). The 
model is based on the logical assumption that 
economic agents may try to exchange their 
different expectations for cash, for example, 
on futures markets. The authors called future 
profits expected by the parties ‘pseudo-wealth’, 
which can trigger economic actions similar to 
the consequences of real assets. in turn, a fall 
in consumption due to the decline in pseudo-
wealth may lead to falling outputs, and as a 
direct consequence of it to lowering prices and 
real wages, which may increase the real burden 
of debt and further reduce consumption. This 
can cause problems due to price and wage 
rigidities: excessive price or wage reductions 
on non-indexed debt increase the real burden 
of repayments, reduce aggregate demand, 
which further reduces prices and wages.
The pseudo-wealth theory can also be 
fitted with the example of Hungarian foreign 
currency lending. At the time of borrowing, 
debtors expected much lower instalments, 
leading to a fall in aggregate demand in the 
post-crisis period, while drawing an excessively 
high consumption trajectory before the crisis. 
However, in case of an economic crisis, it is 
not just the decline in pseudo-wealth that 
is causing the problem: lending constraints 
become effective forcing debtors to reduce 
their outstanding loans, and households 
free from loans increasing their prudential 
savings, thereby narrowing aggregate demand 
(Guerrieri and Lorenzoni, 2017).
According to Stiglitz (1990), if a product is 
priced high on the market, actors may think 
that this will be the case in the future, which 
may cause real changes in the real economy. 
Regarding the bubble, he believes that if 
investors’ expectations reflect that they believe 
the asset can be sold at a higher price than 
expected, the price of the asset will increase. 
According to Stiglitz, a bubble is created when 
today’s high price is based simply on investors’ 
belief in the future high price, but real factors 
do not justify it.
internal disruptions in the real-world 
financial system sometimes distort the 
efficiency of transmission channels to the real 
sector. The role of the institutions responsible 
for the operation and supervision of the 
financial system is essential both ex-ante and 
ex-post. However, economic bubble formation 
raises the need for a deeper examination of 
Minsky’s (1992) assessment of whether this 
phenomenon is immanent to the economic 
system of our time. Of course, after most 
crises, stabilising measures are taken both 
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on the regulatory and institutional side, but 
deeper analyses could help to clarify how 
deep the roots are buried into the system, and 
what are its connected underlying pillars (e.g. 
short-term profit motive). Without this, the 
recurrence of financial crises will be difficult to 
prevent. in the context of the crisis, significant 
progress has been made in the regulation 
and supervision of financial institutions in 
the developed world, including Hungary. 
This included consolidating the relationship 
between financial institutions and their clients, 
with the MNB placing a strong emphasis on 
consumer protection in general as well as on 
the protection of vulnerable consumers in 
particular (Lentner, 2016). Previous micro-
prudential supervision was complemented by 
macro-prudential supervision and regulation, 
which also takes into account the relationship 
between the actors of the system. in our 
opinion, however, it would be over-confident 
to say that the real sector should not be subject 
to disruption caused by the financial system.
HySTErESiS and THE uSE 
oF THE FiSCal mulTiPliCaTor
The 2008 crisis has raised theoretical interest 
in the budget policy issues of economic 
theories, especially since fiscal consolidation 
has become a prominent feature of the uS 
and europe during the crisis (Borsi, 2016). 
The theory is complicated by the fact that 
the multiplier effect is not observable, rather 
it can only be estimated. The differences are 
not due to the application of different models; 
the different results are imputed to different 
measurement methods, to the content of fiscal 
policy measures, as well as to differences in 
economic conditions and trust management.
Whalen and Reichling (2015) report the 
multiplier measurement results achieved by 
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
model in the short and long term. The 
short-term impact is directly reflected in the 
demand for goods and services. in the longer 
term (over this time current output catches 
up with potential output), budget policy can 
influence output by altering work, savings as 
well as investment incentives for individuals 
and businesses alike. The immediate effect 
depends on the intervention. Spending uSd 
1 on goods or services increases your demand 
by uSd 1. if the uSd 1 appears in a tax or 
transfer change, the effect depends on how 
the subject responds to it. indirect effects 
can enhance multiplication phenomena: if 
through direct effects demand for goods and 
services raise, it shall encourage the private 
sector to increase investment and recruit new 
employees. But it can also be weakened if, as 
a result of government tax cuts or spending 
increases, higher interest rates are obtained, 
which further reduces investment and 
consumption. Table 1 below shows the CBO’s 
estimate of uS fiscal multipliers.
it can be seen that the multiplier for direct 
purchases of goods and services is the highest – 
covering a fairly wide range – while the lowest 
is the corporate tax provision that primarily 
concerns cash.
Cebi and Özdemir (2019) examined 
the characteristics of fiscal multipliers on 
turkish data. They found that the value of 
the fiscal multiplier is higher in periods of 
lower economic growth, and the multiplier 
of government investments is higher than the 
multiplier of government purchases regardless 
of whether the economy is in low or high 
growth period.
Mirdala and Kamenik (2017) estimated fiscal 
multipliers for the Czech Republic, Slovakia 
and Hungary based on data for the period 
between 1995 and 2015. in their analysis, 
both expenditure and revenue multipliers 
were quantified, and separate calculations 
were made for periods of low and high growth. 
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They find that in all three countries the impact 
of expenditure shocks is higher than of 
revenue. in Hungary and the Czech Republic 
the value of the fiscal expenditure multiplier 
is higher in times of crisis. in Slovakia there 
is no significant difference, as the impact of 
the expenditure shock is always high and the 
revenue shock is always low (see Table 2).
Solow (2012) emphasised that there is an 
extremely wide variation in the perception 
and magnitude of the multiplier as far as 
professionals’ opinion is concerned, which 
tends to negatively affect the acceptance of the 
metric. Those who disapprove the use of the 
multiplier tend to attest a smaller multiplier. 
With regard to multipliers he calls our 
attention to the following:
The multiplier depends on the current 
state of the economy and the course of economic 
policy applied. The revision of the multiplier 
estimate should take into account that there 
may be a bidirectional causal link between 
aggregate demand and budget expenditure, and 
thus, the assumptions should be made under 
the presumption of an economic environment 
with significant oversupply.
taking monetary policy into account. if 
the central bank acts according to the taylor 
rule, monetary policy acts as a quasi-automatic 
stabiliser, as the central bank must offset – at 
least in part – any increase in real GdP, even 
if general economic conditions are weak. 
The magnitude of the impact of fiscal policy 
depends on the strength of the central bank’s 
backlash. in the event of a deeper recession, 
the taylor rule would require negative (real) 
interest rates, but the central bank has less 
room for manoeuvre in this range, so it 
does not respond as strongly to fiscal policy 
intervention; consequently, the multipliers are 
higher.
The effect of disposable income growth 
on savings induced by economic policy. When 
households have a high debt burden, even 
relatively poor families tend to increase their 
loan repayments instead of consuming the 
extra income provided by the state, which 
reduces the size of the multiplier.
Another disadvantage of stabilisers, 
according to Solow, is that they act in the 
direction of smoothing fluctuations. That is, 
when the output reaches its peak and begins 
Table 1
RANGES FOR U.S. FISCAL MULTIPLIERS
Type of Activity Lower estimate Top estimate
Purchases of goods and Services by the Federal government 0.5 2.5
Transfer Payments to State and local governments for infrastructure 0.4 2.2
Transfer Payments to State and local governments for other Purposes 0.4 1.8
Transfer Payments to individuals 0.4 2.1
one-Time Payments to retirees 0.2 1.0
Two-year Tax Cuts for lower- and middle-income People 0.3 1.5
one-year Tax Cut for Higher-income People 0.1 0.6
Extension of First-Time Homebuyer Credit 0.2 0.8
Corporate Tax Provisions Primarily affecting Cash Flow 0.0 0.4
Source: wahlen–reichling (2015), p. 11
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to fall, forces against downward movement are 
preferred, but when the output reaches its lowest 
point and begins to rise, it is unfavourable if 
the same moderates the recovery.
From time to time, it could also be beneficial 
to introduce a tax system linked to the Okun-
gap5, where changes in the gap would determine 
tax rates. Such a system would, in theory, 
facilitate the achievement of the target output 
level and prevent its displacement. However, 
due to the temporary application, this seems 
difficult to imagine. The problem with this is 
that economic policy does not know where the 
economy stands within the business cycle, it 
can only be assessed afterwards. in Hungary, 
before the crisis assumption had it that output 
gap was negative, although it turned out to be 
the opposite afterwards. According to Solow, 
increasing world trade and free movement 
of capital raise the need for international 
coordination of budgetary policies.
The work of Stiglitz (2014) stands out 
from the most important theoretical findings 
concerning the multiplier. According to it, the 
size of the multiplier is the most important 
issue in periods of high unemployment 
and low production capacity. it raises three 
problems:
unemployment and exploitation of 
labour capacity have not been as high since 
the crisis of 1930 as they were at the time of 
the crisis of 2008; having said that, today’s 
structure of the economy is very different 
from that of the time, and therefore, previous 
experience cannot be applied to the current 
situation with reliability.
Neoclassical theories measured the 
multiplier effect in the short term – 2 years – as 
they assumed that the economy would return 
to full employment within this time. With the 
recent extended setback, it has become clear 
that the multiplier effect can only be measured 
over the long term.
Another question is whether there is 
a crowding out effect. But that depends on 
monetary policy: in the case of a persistent 
loose monetary policy, there is no such effect. 
We have a demand-creating effect here, as 
government spending also stimulates private 
investments (crowding-in).
According to the Barro–Ricardo hypothesis, 
an increase in government debt triggers 
an increase in savings for offsetting the 
expected higher tax burden on households. 
Thus, the government spending causing the 
escalation of debts has a crowding out effect 
on consumption. According to Stiglitz, this 
thesis cannot be applied to contemporary 
economy, since, in practice, augmentation in 
public expenditures covered by the deficit is 
incrementing consumption today. if the state 
spends on high-yield investments when real 
Table 2
4 QUARTERLY CUMULATED FISCAL MULTIPLIER IN THE SLOW AND FAST GROWTH PHASE 
BETWEEN 1995-2015
Expenditure Shock Revenue Shock
low growth High growth low growth High growth
Czech republic 0.33 -0.32 0.06 -0.15
Hungary 0.58 0.10 0.24 0.05
Slovakia 0.60 0.72 0.01 0.10
Source: mirdala és Kamenik (2017), p. 57
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interest rates are negative, the government 
balance will be improved, savings will shrink, 
and a consumption growth is generated.
if the downward trend of the economy is 
sustained, some of the current savings will 
be spent on future consumption. Assuming 
rational expectations, individuals know that 
future incomes will be higher, which means 
that their lifecycle consumption prospects are 
expected to be improved, which further may 
lead to increased consumption in the present.
A well-established multiplier estimate takes 
into account that different types of spending 
have different effects. it does not matter what 
the multiplier was in the past, but how efficient 
government spending is in the present.
to sum it up, within the context of the 
above mentioned theoretical fermentation 
initiated in relation to the multiplier, a 
number of important and compared to 
the orthodox valuations forward-looking 
conclusions were born, which may help to 
define criteria for the economic theory against 
those specific multipliers and their compelling 
application. Moreover, it has been established 
that the development of the multiplier 
requires a combination of credit and business 
cycles, taking also into account the types of 
government spending.
The openness of the country is another 
factor that has to be taken into consideration 
for Hungary. Consequently, not only the way 
we stimulate demand, but also the targeted 
sector matters, as the range of products and 
services purchased by each sector and the value 
added from imports are different. extensive 
research on the estimation of multipliers would 
be crucial for our country because fiscal policy 
has limited flexibility; necessarily, the efficient 
use of available funds is a pivotal question. 
A detailed examination of fiscal multipliers 
could be applied not only to fiscal stimulus 
measures in crisis situations, but also to the 
use of eu funds, while taking into account 
the relationship between cycles and the fiscal 
multipliers for time distribution. in relation to 
this, in her study, Vörös (2018) draws attention 
to the problems of multiplier estimation in the 
context of cost-benefit analyses.
ConCluSionS
As a result of the 2008 crisis and the subsequent 
slow recovery, macroeconomics runs into a dire 
straits. This is true for both the handling of 
theoretical relationships and the methodology. 
And the experience telling us the truth: what 
happened during and after the crisis could 
not have happened and especially not in this 
way, according to mainstream theories. This is 
most clearly expressed in one of the headings 
of Stiglitz’s frequently quoted work: ‘Back to 
the Beginnings’.6
in order for macroeconomics to fulfil its 
expected role in society, that is, to explain 
macroeconomic developments empirically, 
to assist economic and social development 
through economic policy guidance; moreover, 
to set the economic criteria for sustainable 
development, it must be reformed.
in addition to the macroeconomic 
interpretation of positive trends and the complex 
presentation of forces affecting equilibrium, it 
is also necessary to thoroughly map the system’s 
characteristics when equilibrium is lacking, 
and to demonstrate its operation, starting with 
the potential causes.
As a result of the crisis, the practice of active 
budgetary policies has been strengthened, 
which is an encouraging sign of a theoretical 
shift towards providing constructive theoretical 
solutions. However, it gave us mixed results, 
since after the crisis, many countries that have 
been able to pursue active budgetary policies 
on the basis of their budgetary conditions, 
have abandoned it.
it is also a question of whether history 
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repeats itself and the same economic-
theoretical restoration that followed the 
Keynesian Revolution takes place.
in addition to the need for a small open 
country, such as Hungary, to adapt to the 
international environment, internal room 
for manoeuvre embraces a strengthening 
theoretical training, the possible establishment 
of new public institutions for this purpose, 
and the theoretical knowledge (both orthodox 
and unorthodox) required to meet economic 
challenges at national level, as well as transfer 
and development of knowledge. it is important 
to be able to learn from the mistakes of the past 
(such as over-indebtedness) and not to repeat 
them so that the next crisis does not slow us 
down significantly compared to the trend. 
The goal is to continue to talk about positive 
hysteresis, in other words, the economy shall 
grow faster than previously anticipated as a 
result of the economic policy shift, and shall 
avoid such downturn in the event of a crisis.
1 The study prepared by the Századvég Political 
School Foundation for the Central Bank of Hun-
gary (Magyar Nemzeti Bank) in May 2017 was 
the starting point of this paper.
2 in this work, the authors use the term in relation 
with employment, and extend the meaning of the 
term to persistence of unemployment, and the 
long-term effects of shocks on unemployment.
3 Blanchard (2008), p. 2
4 The concept was introduced by Hansen (1941) 
and refers to a state of the economy where capital 
accumulation is not large enough to enable full 
employment.
5 This is the difference between the actual and 
potential level of GdP growth.
6 Stiglitz (2014) p. 3
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